rfc6810.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-08.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Request for Comments: 6810 Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Category: Standards Track R. Austein Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein
ISSN: 2070-1721 Dragon Research Labs Expires: July 11, 2017 Dragon Research Labs
January 2013 January 7, 2017
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-08
Abstract Abstract
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems and
announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to Autonomous System Paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple
receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure
data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to (RFC 6480) prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache.
deliver validated prefix origin data to routers. This document describes a protocol to deliver them.
This document describes version 1 of the rpki-rtr protocol. RFC 6810
describes version 0.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document. This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
received public review and has been approved for publication by the working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810. time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 11, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Changes from RFC 6810 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.10. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 12. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes) In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes)
of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to and AS paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable
receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] mechanism to receive cryptographically validated Resource Public Key
cryptographically validated prefix origin data from a trusted cache. Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] prefix origin data and router keys
This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver
data to routers. The design is intentionally constrained to be them. The design is intentionally constrained to be usable on much
usable on much of the current generation of ISP router platforms. of the current generation of ISP router platforms.
Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then
presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the
protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected
sequences are described in Section 6. The transport protocol options Protocol Data Unit (PDU) sequences are described in Section 8. The
are described in Section 7. Section 8 details how routers and caches transport protocol options are described in Section 9. Section 10
are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 9 describes details how routers and caches are configured to connect and
likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and IANA authenticate. Section 11 describes likely deployment scenarios. The
considerations end the document. traditional security and IANA considerations end the document.
The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new
semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs
are versioned should deployment experience call for change. are versioned should deployment experience call for change.
For an implementation (not interoperability) report, see [RTR-IMPL]
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]
only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in
lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning. lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning.
1.2. Changes from RFC 6810
This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6810] and
the protocol described in this document.
o New Router Key PDU type (Section 5.10) added.
o Explicit timing parameters (Section 5.8, Section 6) added.
o Protocol version number incremented from zero to one.
o Protocol version number negotiation (Section 7) added.
2. Glossary 2. Glossary
The following terms are used with special meaning. The following terms are used with special meaning.
Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a
distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registry (NIRs), and ISPs; Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registries (NIRs), and ISPs;
see [RFC6481]. see [RFC6481].
Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI, which is periodically fetched/ Cache: A coalesced copy of the published Global RPKI data,
refreshed directly or indirectly from the Global RPKI using the periodically fetched or refreshed, directly or indirectly, using
[RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to the [RFC5781] protocol or some successor. Relying party software
gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. is used to gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI
Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of into a cache. Trusting this cache further is a matter between the
the cache and a relying party. provider of the cache and a relying party.
Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer that Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which
wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a
cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates
its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. While a
cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are cache is receiving updates, new incoming data and implicit deletes
associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the are associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the
fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between
caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache different caches or different protocol versions, nor need it be
server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too maintained across resets of the cache server. See [RFC1982] on
much detail on the topic. DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too much detail on the topic.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session
identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to ID to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to bind it
bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will
generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session
knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with
that of the cache. that of the cache.
Payload PDU: A protocol message which contains data for use by the
router, as opposed to a PDU which conveys the control mechanisms
of this protocol. Prefixes and Router Keys are examples of
payload PDUs.
3. Deployment Structure 3. Deployment Structure
Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure
as follows: as follows:
Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a
distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g., distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g.,
the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see [RFC6481]. by the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs (see [RFC6481]).
Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified
caches. A relying party, e.g., router or other client, MUST have caches of RPKI data. A relying party, e.g., router or other
a trust relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any client, MUST have a trust relationship with, and a trusted
authoritative cache(s) it uses. transport channel to, any cache(s) it uses.
Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol
described in this document. It is said to be a client of the described in this document. It is said to be a client of the
cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of
the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the
cache. cache (see Section 9).
4. Operational Overview 4. Operational Overview
A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more
caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is
configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a
connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which
accept the connections. accept the connections.
The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or
set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches
and the Global RPKI. and the Global RPKI.
Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the Periodically, the router sends to the cache the most recent Serial
highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the Number for which it has has received data from that cache, i.e., the
router's current Serial Number. When a router establishes a new router's current Serial Number, in the form of a Serial Query. When
connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it a router establishes a new session with a cache, or wishes to reset a
sends a Reset Query. current relationship, it sends a Reset Query.
The Cache responds with all data records that have Serial Numbers The cache responds to the Serial Query with all data changes which
greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set, took place since the given Serial Number. This may be the null set,
in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater' in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that the
must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982]. Serial Number comparison used to determine "since the given Serial
Number" MUST take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982].
When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets
its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the
Data PDU. received End of Data PDU.
When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to
every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a
good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint. good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint.
The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in
any case. any case.
Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for
a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very
inefficient. The Serial Number based incremental update mechanism inefficient. The Serial Number based incremental update mechanism
allows an efficient transfer of just the data records that have allows an efficient transfer of just the data records which have
changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on
incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a
full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the
necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer
protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit
request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the
cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established
sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better
service. service.
As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin
Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers' Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers'
clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour.
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs)
The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of
exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in
Section 6. Section 8.
Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY Reserved fields (marked "zero" in PDU diagrams) MUST be zero on
be ignored on receipt. transmission, and SHOULD be ignored on receipt.
5.1. Fields of a PDU 5.1. Fields of a PDU
PDUs contain the following data elements: PDUs contain the following data elements:
Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 0, Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 1,
denoting the version of this protocol. denoting the version of this protocol.
PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the
PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc. PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc.
Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of
PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from
the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when
completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or
the Global RPKI. the Global RPKI.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session Session ID: A 16-bit unsigned integer. When a cache server is
ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the started, it generates a Session ID to identify the instance of the
sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate. cache and to bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache
This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that instance will generate. This allows the router to restart a
the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the failed session knowing that the Serial Number it is using is
cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the commensurate with that of the cache. If, at any time after the
value of the session identifier is not the same as the other's, protocol version has been negotiated (Section 7), either the
they MUST completely drop the session and the router MUST flush router or the cache finds the value of the Session ID is not the
all data learned from that cache. same as the other's, the party which detects the mismatch MUST
immediately terminate the session with an Error Report PDU with
code 0 ("Corrupt Data"), and the router MUST flush all data
learned from that cache.
Note that sessions are specific to a particular protocol version.
That is: if a cache server supports multiple versions of this
protocol, happens to use the same Session ID value for multiple
protocol versions, and further happens to use the same Serial
Number values for two or more sessions using the same Session ID
but different Protocol Version values, the serial numbers are not
commensurate. The full test for whether serial numbers are
commensurate requires comparing Protocol Version, Session ID, and
Serial Number. To reduce the risk of confusion, cache servers
SHOULD NOT use the same Session ID across multiple protocol
versions, but even if they do, routers MUST treat sessions with
different Protocol Version fields as separate sessions even if
they do happen to have the same Session ID.
Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router
does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and does not realize that the session has changed (old Session ID and
new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become new Session ID have same numeric value), the router may become
confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the
router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the
Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old
and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to
the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the
problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may
respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring
the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain
that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state
that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache
Response may tell the router to drop a record that the router does Response may tell the router to drop a record which the router
not hold, or may tell the router to add a record that the router does not hold, or may tell the router to add a record which the
already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error and router already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error
reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay out and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay
of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any data out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any
currently held by the router. data currently held by the router.
Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock- Using persistent storage for the Session ID or a clock-based
based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the scheme for generating Session IDs should avoid the risk of Session
risk of session identifier collisions. ID collisions.
The Session ID might be a pseudo-random value, a strictly The Session ID might be a pseudo-random value, a strictly
increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, etc. increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, et cetera. A
seconds-since-epoch timestamp value such as the POSIX time()
function makes a good Session ID value.
Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer that has as its value the count of Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count
the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of header of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of
that end with the length field. header which includes the length field.
Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an
announcement and 0 for a withdrawal, whether this PDU announces a announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or
new right to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right
announced right. A withdraw effectively deletes one previously to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right;
announced IPvX (IPv4 or IPv6) Prefix PDU with the exact same a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU
Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System Number (ASN). with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System
Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates
whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one
previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS Number,
subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo.
The remaining bits in the flags field are reserved for future use.
In protocol version 1, they MUST be 0 on transmission and SHOULD
be ignored on receipt.
Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest
prefix allowed for the prefix. prefix allowed for the Prefix element.
Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix
allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix allowed by the Prefix element. This MUST NOT be less than the
Length element. Prefix Length element.
Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA.
Autonomous System Number: ASN allowed to announce this prefix, a Autonomous System Number: A 32-bit unsigned integer representing an
32-bit unsigned integer. ASN allowed to announce a prefix or associated with a router key.
Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of Subject Key Identifier: 20-octet Subject Key Identifier (SKI) value
such a field MUST be ignored on receipt. of a router key, as described in [RFC6487].
Subject Public Key Info: a router key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value,
as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full
ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the
ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
Refresh Interval: Interval between normal cache polls. See
Section 6
Retry Interval: Interval between cache poll retries after a failed
cache poll. See Section 6
Expire Interval: Interval during which data fetched from a cache
remains valid in the absence of a successful subsequent cache
poll. See Section 6
5.2. Serial Notify 5.2. Serial Notify
The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data.
The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are
commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed. commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed.
Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an
immediate Serial Query (Section 5.3) or Reset Query (Section 5.4)
without waiting for the Refresh Interval timer (see Section 6) to
expire.
Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not
in response to a message from the router. in response to a message from the router.
If the router receives a Serial Notify PDU during the initial start-
up period where the router and cache are still negotiating to agree
on a protocol version, the router MUST simply ignore the Serial
Notify PDU, even if the Serial Notify PDU is for an unexpected
protocol version. See Section 7 for details.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 0 | | | 1 | 0 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.3. Serial Query 5.3. Serial Query
Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all announcements
payload PDUs that have Serial Numbers higher than the Serial Number and withdrawals which have occurred since the Serial Number specified
in the Serial Query. in the Serial Query.
The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU
(Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the (Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the
changes since the Serial Number specified by the router. If there changes since the Serial Number specified by the router, followed by
have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache sends zero or more payload PDUs and an End Of Data PDU (Section 5.8).
an End Of Data PDU.
When replying to a Serial Query, the cache MUST return the minimum
set of changes needed to bring the router into sync with the cache.
That is, if a particular prefix or router key underwent multiple
changes between the Serial Number specified by the router and the
cache's current Serial Number, the cache MUST merge those changes to
present the simplest possible view of those changes to the router.
In general, this means that, for any particular prefix or router key,
the data stream will include at most one withdrawal followed by at
most one announcement, and if all of the changes cancel out, the data
stream will not mention the prefix or router key at all.
The rationale for this approach is that the entire purpose of the
rpki-rtr protocol is to offload work from the router to the cache,
and it should therefore be the cache's job to simplify the change
set, thus reducing work for the router.
If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router, If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router,
perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in
the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU
(Section 5.9). (Section 5.9).
The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to
ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache
session has not been changed. session has not been changed.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.4. Reset Query 5.4. Reset Query
Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the total active,
total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds with a Cache
with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5). Response PDU (Section 5.5), followed by zero or more payload PDUs and
an End of Data PDU (Section 5.8).
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 0 | 2 | | | 1 | 2 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.5. Cache Response 5.5. Cache Response
Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. The cache responds to queries with zero or more payload PDUs. When
When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache replying to a Serial Query (Section 5.3), the cache sends the set of
sends the set of all data records it has with Serial Numbers greater announcements and withdrawals that have occurred since the Serial
than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query, Number sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query
the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case, the (Section 5.4), the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in
withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1 this case, the withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have
(announce). the value 1 (announce).
In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells
the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation. the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation.
In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same
reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e.,
the cache session has not changed. the cache session has not changed.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 3 | | | 1 | 3 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.6. IPv4 Prefix 5.6. IPv4 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 0 | 4 | | | 1 | 4 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=20 | | Length=20 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | Prefix | Max | | | | Prefix | Max | |
| Flags | Length | Length | zero | | Flags | Length | Length | zero |
| | 0..32 | 0..32 | | | | 0..32 | 0..32 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
skipping to change at page 11, line 20 skipping to change at page 13, line 10
ASN} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an ASN} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an
IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it
already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received
error. error.
5.7. IPv6 Prefix 5.7. IPv6 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 0 | 6 | | | 1 | 6 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=32 | | Length=32 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | Prefix | Max | | | | Prefix | Max | |
| Flags | Length | Length | zero | | Flags | Length | Length | zero |
| | 0..128 | 0..128 | | | | 0..128 | 0..128 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
skipping to change at page 12, line 7 skipping to change at page 13, line 38
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Autonomous System Number | | Autonomous System Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic. Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic.
5.8. End of Data 5.8. End of Data
End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the The cache tells the router it has no more data for the request.
request.
The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache The Session ID and Protocol Version MUST be the same as that of the
Response that began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs. corresponding Cache Response which began the, possibly null, sequence
of payload PDUs.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 7 | | | 1 | 7 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=24 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Refresh Interval |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Retry Interval |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Expire Interval |
| |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
The Refresh Interval, Retry Interval, and Expire Interval are all
32-bit elapsed times measured in seconds, and express the timing
parameters which the cache expects the router to use in deciding when
to send subsequent Serial Query or Reset Query PDUs to the cache.
See Section 6 for an explanation of the use and the range of allowed
values for these parameters.
5.9. Cache Reset 5.9. Cache Reset
The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the
cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial
Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to
issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache. issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 0 | 8 | | | 1 | 8 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.10. Error Report 5.10. Router Key
0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | |
| Version | Type | Flags | zero |
| 1 | 9 | | |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Length |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
+--- ---+
| Subject Key Identifier |
+--- ---+
| |
+--- ---+
| (20 octets) |
+--- ---+
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| AS Number |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Subject Public Key Info |
| |
`-------------------------------------------'
The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and
0 for a withdrawal.
The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to
have one and only one Router Key PDU for a unique {SKI, ASN, Subject
Public Key} at any one point in time. Should the router client
receive a Router Key PDU with a {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key}
identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate
Announcement Received error.
Note that a particular ASN may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs
with different Subject Public Key values, while a particular Subject
Public Key value may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs with
different ASNs. In the interest of keeping the announcement and
withdrawal semantics as simple as possible for the router, this
protocol makes no attempt to compress either of these cases.
Also note that it is possible, albeit very unlikely, for multiple
distinct Subject Public Key values to hash to the same SKI. For this
reason, implementations MUST compare Subject Public Key values as
well as SKIs when detecting duplicate PDUs.
5.11. Error Report
This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other.
Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs. Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs, not to report
errors in Error Report PDUS.
The Error Code is described in Section 10. The Error Code is described in Section 12.
If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated
with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST
be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero. be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero.
An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an
erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be
dropped. dropped.
If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too
long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or a long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or a
possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated. possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated.
The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error
Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a
string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]). string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3629]).
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Error Code | | Version | Type | Error Code |
| 0 | 10 | | | 1 | 10 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length | | Length |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length of Encapsulated PDU | | Length of Encapsulated PDU |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
skipping to change at page 14, line 5 skipping to change at page 17, line 34
| Length of Error Text | | Length of Error Text |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Arbitrary Text | | Arbitrary Text |
| of | | of |
~ Error Diagnostic Message ~ ~ Error Diagnostic Message ~
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
6. Protocol Sequences 6. Protocol Timing Parameters
Since the data the cache distributes via the rpki-rtr protocol are
retrieved from the Global RPKI system at intervals which are only
known to the cache, only the cache can really know how frequently it
makes sense for the router to poll the cache, or how long the data
are likely to remain valid (or, at least, unchanged). For this
reason, as well as to allow the cache some control over the load
placed on it by its client routers, the End Of Data PDU includes
three values that allow the cache to communicate timing parameters to
the router.
Refresh Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait
before next attempting to poll the cache and between subsequent
attempts, using a Serial Query or Reset Query PDU. The router
SHOULD NOT poll the cache sooner than indicated by this parameter.
Note that receipt of a Serial Notify PDU overrides this interval
and suggests that the router issue an immediate query without
waiting for the Refresh Interval to expire. Countdown for this
timer starts upon receipt of the containing End Of Data PDU.
Minimum allowed value: 1 second.
Maximum allowed value: 86400 seconds (one day).
Recommended default: 3600 seconds (one hour).
Retry Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait
before retrying a failed Serial Query or Reset Query. The router
SHOULD NOT retry sooner than indicated by this parameter. Note
that a protocol version mismatch overrides this interval: if the
router needs to downgrade to a lower protocol version number, it
MAY send the first Serial Query or Reset Query immediately.
Countdown for this timer starts upon failure of the query, and
restarts after each subsequent failure until a query succeeds.
Minimum allowed value: 1 second.
Maximum allowed value: 7200 seconds (two hours).
Recommended default: 600 seconds (ten minutes).
Expire Interval: This parameter tells the router how long it can
continue to use the current version of the data while unable to
perform a successful subsequent query. The router MUST NOT retain
the data past the time indicated by this parameter. Countdown for
this timer starts upon receipt of the containing End Of Data PDU.
Minimum allowed value: 600 seconds (ten minutes).
Maximum allowed value: 172800 seconds (two days).
Recommended default: 7200 seconds (two hours).
If the router has never issued a successful query against a
particular cache, it SHOULD retry periodically using the default
Retry Interval, above.
7. Protocol Version Negotiation
A router MUST start each transport connection by issuing either a
Reset Query or a Serial Query. This query will tell the cache which
version of this protocol the router implements.
If a cache which supports version 1 receives a query from a router
which specifies version 0, the cache MUST downgrade to protocol
version 0 [RFC6810] or send a version 1 Error Report PDU with Error
Code 4 ("Unsupported Protocol Version") and terminate the connection.
If a router which supports version 1 sends a query to a cache which
only supports version 0, one of two things will happen.
1. The cache may terminate the connection, perhaps with a version 0
Error Report PDU. In this case the router MAY retry the
connection using protocol version 0.
2. The cache may reply with a version 0 response. In this case the
router MUST either downgrade to version 0 or terminate the
connection.
In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of
version 1 will not be available, and all PDUs will have 0 in their
version fields.
If either party receives a PDU containing an unrecognized Protocol
Version (neither 0 nor 1) during this negotiation, it MUST either
downgrade to a known version or terminate the connection, with an
Error Report PDU unless the received PDU is itself an Error Report
PDU.
The router MUST ignore any Serial Notify PDUs it might receive from
the cache during this initial start-up period, regardless of the
Protocol Version field in the Serial Notify PDU. Since Session ID
and Serial Number values are specific to a particular protocol
version, the values in the notification are not useful to the router.
Even if these values were meaningful, the only effect that processing
the notification would have would be to trigger exactly the same
Reset Query or Serial Query that the router has already sent as part
of the not-yet-complete version negotiation process, so there is
nothing to be gained by processing notifications until version
negotiation completes.
Caches SHOULD NOT send Serial Notify PDUs before version negotiation
completes. Routers, however, MUST handle such notifications (by
ignoring them) for backwards compatibility with caches serving
protocol version 0.
Once the cache and router have agreed upon a Protocol Version via the
negotiation process above, that version is stable for the life of the
session. See Section 5.1 for a discussion of the interaction between
Protocol Version and Session ID.
If either party receives a PDU for a different Protocol Version once
the above negotiation completes, that party MUST drop the session;
unless the PDU containing the unexpected Protocol Version was itself
an Error Report PDU, the party dropping the session SHOULD send an
Error Report with an error code of 8 ("Unexpected Protocol Version").
8. Protocol Sequences
The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as
follows: follows:
6.1. Start or Restart 8.1. Start or Restart
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query) | <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query)
| | | |
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- Payload PDU ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- Payload PDU ------> | IPv4 Prefix, IPv6 Prefix,
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------- Payload PDU ------> | or Router Key PDUs
| ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | ------- End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data
| | and sends new serial | | and sends new serial
~ ~ ~ ~
When a transport session is first established, the router MAY send a When a transport connection is first established, the router MUST
Reset Query and the cache responds with a data sequence of all data send either a Reset Query or a Serial Query. A Serial Query would be
it contains. appropriate if the router has significant unexpired data from a
broken session with the same cache and remembers the Session ID of
Alternatively, if the router has significant unexpired data from a that session, in which case a Serial Query containing the Session ID
broken session with the same cache, it MAY start with a Serial Query from the previous session will allow the router to bring itself up to
containing the Session ID from the previous session to ensure the date while ensuring that the Serial Numbers are commensurate and that
Serial Numbers are commensurate. the router and cache are speaking compatible versions of the
protocol. In all other cases, the router lacks the necessary data
for fast re-synchronization and therefore MUST fall back to a Reset
Query.
This Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a The Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a
Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost
its way. its way.
See Section 7 for details on version negotiation.
To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to
generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial
Query or a Reset Query no less frequently than once an hour. This Query or a Reset Query periodically. This also acts as a keep-alive
also acts as a keep-alive at the application layer. at the application layer. See Section 6 for details on the required
polling frequency.
As the cache MAY not keep updates for little more than one hour, the
router MUST have a polling interval of no greater than once an hour.
6.2. Typical Exchange 8.2. Typical Exchange
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| -------- Notify ----------> | (optional) | -------- Notify ----------> | (optional)
| | | |
| <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data | <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data
| | | |
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- Payload PDU ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- Payload PDU ------> | IPv4 Prefix, IPv6 Prefix,
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------- Payload PDU ------> | or Router Key PDUs
| ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | ------- End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data
| | and sends new serial | | and sends new serial
~ ~ ~ ~
The cache server SHOULD send a notify PDU with its current Serial The cache server SHOULD send a notify PDU with its current Serial
Number when the cache's serial changes, with the expectation that the Number when the cache's serial changes, with the expectation that the
router MAY then issue a Serial Query earlier than it otherwise might. router MAY then issue a Serial Query earlier than it otherwise might.
This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate
limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute. limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute.
When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the
router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new
data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer
than the serial in the Serial Query. than the serial in the Serial Query.
To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router
MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query no less frequently MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query periodically. See
than once an hour. Section 6 for details on the required polling frequency.
6.3. No Incremental Update Available 8.3. No Incremental Update Available
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data
| ------- Cache Reset ------> | C cannot supply update | ------- Cache Reset ------> | C cannot supply update
| | from specified serial | | from specified serial
| <------ Reset Query ------- | R requests new data | <------ Reset Query ------- | R requests new data
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- Payload PDU ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- Payload PDU ------> | IPv4 Prefix, IPv6 Prefix,
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------- Payload PDU ------> | or Router Key PDUs
| ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | ------- End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data
| | and sends new serial | | and sends new serial
~ ~ ~ ~
The cache may respond to a Serial Query with a Cache Reset, informing The cache may respond to a Serial Query with a Cache Reset, informing
the router that the cache cannot supply an incremental update from the router that the cache cannot supply an incremental update from
the Serial Number specified by the router. This might be because the the Serial Number specified by the router. This might be because the
cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long
between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer
believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space
and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state
arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that
it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router
SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache
list. If there are no more preferred caches, it MUST issue a Reset list. If there are no more preferred caches, it MUST issue a Reset
Query and get an entire new load from the cache. Query and get an entire new load from the cache.
6.4. Cache Has No Data Available 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data
| ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available
~ ~ ~ ~
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data | <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data
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sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it
initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still
rebuilding its database. rebuilding its database.
When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt
to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference
order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue
periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the
cache. cache.
7. Transport 9. Transport
The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the
binary PDUs in a persistent session. binary PDUs in a persistent session.
To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it
is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to
each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to
protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately, protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately,
there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms. there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms.
Therefore, as of the writing of this document, there is no mandatory- Therefore, as of the writing of this document, there is no mandatory-
to-implement transport that provides authentication and integrity to-implement transport which provides authentication and integrity
protection. protection.
To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both
caches and routers SHOULD enable keep-alives when available in the caches and routers SHOULD enable keep-alives when available in the
chosen transport protocol. chosen transport protocol.
It is expected that, when the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) It is expected that, when the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)
[RFC5925] is available on all platforms deployed by operators, it [RFC5925] is available on all platforms deployed by operators, it
will become the mandatory-to-implement transport. will become the mandatory-to-implement transport.
Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP
using a port, rpki-rtr (323); see Section 12. Operators SHOULD use using a port, rpki-rtr (323); see Section 14. Operators SHOULD use
procedural means, e.g., access control lists (ACLs), to reduce the procedural means, e.g., access control lists (ACLs), to reduce the
exposure to authentication issues. exposure to authentication issues.
Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec
transport.
If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on
the same trusted and controlled network. the same trusted and controlled network.
If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the
following more protected protocols. following more protected protocols.
Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the
rpki-rtr port. rpki-rtr port.
Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using the normal
normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 7.1. SSH port. For an example, see Section 9.1.
Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the
rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO
[RFC5925]. [RFC5925].
Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki- Caches and routers MAY use TCP over IPsec transport [RFC4301] using
rtr port. the rpki-rtr port.
Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port, Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using port rpki-
rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 12. rtr-tls (324); see Section 14.
7.1. SSH Transport 9.1. SSH Transport
To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport
connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and
server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The
client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the
application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol
[RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated, [RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated,
the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the
SSH connection protocol. SSH connection protocol.
skipping to change at page 18, line 33 skipping to change at page 24, line 30
the application transport as an SSH subsystem called "rpki-rtr". the application transport as an SSH subsystem called "rpki-rtr".
Subsystem support is a feature of SSH version 2 (SSHv2) and is not Subsystem support is a feature of SSH version 2 (SSHv2) and is not
included in SSHv1. Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids included in SSHv1. Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids
the need for the application to recognize shell prompts or skip over the need for the application to recognize shell prompts or skip over
extraneous information, such as a system message that is sent at extraneous information, such as a system message that is sent at
shell start-up. shell start-up.
It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of
band by some reasonably secured means. band by some reasonably secured means.
Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and Digital Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA authentication
Signature Algorithm (DSA) authentication and SHOULD accept Elliptic and SHOULD accept Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) authentication. User authentication. User authentication MUST be supported; host
authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be authentication MAY be supported. Implementations MAY support
supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication. password authentication. Client routers SHOULD verify the public key
Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache to avoid of the cache to avoid monkey-in-the-middle attacks.
monkey-in-the-middle attacks.
7.2. TLS Transport 9.2. TLS Transport
Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side
certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to
allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from
unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and
certificate authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache certificate authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache
operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue
certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential
rollover; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may rollover; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may
be used. be used.
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connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the
connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection. connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection.
Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using
subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid
monkey-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in monkey-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in
[RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations: [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations:
Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity
in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server
and client implementations that use TLS. Certification and client implementations which use TLS. Certification
authorities that issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support authorities which issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support
the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be
present in rpki-rtr server certificates. present in rpki-rtr server certificates.
DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
wildcard character "*". wildcard character "*".
rpki-rtr implementations that use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID
identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's
subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the
rules described in [RFC6125]. rules described in [RFC6125].
The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS
name of the rpki-rtr cache. name of the rpki-rtr cache.
7.3. TCP MD5 Transport 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport
If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at
least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385]. least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385].
Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least
32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits.
Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD
support [RFC4808]. support [RFC4808].
7.4. TCP-AO Transport 9.4. TCP-AO Transport
Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable
ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences
of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. MAC (Message of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. Message Authentication
Authentication Code) lengths of at least 96 bits MUST be supported, Code (MAC) lengths of at least 96 bits MUST be supported, per
per Section 5.1 of [RFC5925]. Section 5.1 of [RFC5925].
The cryptographic algorithms and associated parameters described in The cryptographic algorithms and associated parameters described in
[RFC5926] MUST be supported. [RFC5926] MUST be supported.
8. Router-Cache Setup 10. Router-Cache Setup
A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is
configured to support. configured to support.
A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a
cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must
have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In
addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value
for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not
trust, preferred belief, etc. The client router attempts to trust, preferred belief, etc. The client router attempts to
establish a session with each potential serving cache in preference establish a session with each potential serving cache in preference
order, and then starts to load data from the most preferred cache to order, and then starts to load data from the most preferred cache to
which it can connect and authenticate. The router's list of caches which it can connect and authenticate. The router's list of caches
has the following elements: has the following elements:
Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to
connect to that cache; the lower the value, the more preferred. connect to that cache; the lower the value, the more preferred.
Name: The IP address or fully qualified domain name of the cache. Name: The IP address or fully qualified domain name of the cache.
Key: Any needed public key of the cache. Cache Credential(s): Any credential (such as a public key) needed to
authenticate the cache's identity to the router.
MyKey: Any needed private key or certificate of this client. Router Credential(s): Any credential (such as a private key or
certificate) needed to authenticate the router's identity to the
cache.
Due to the distributed nature of the RPKI, caches simply cannot be Due to the distributed nature of the RPKI, caches simply cannot be
rigorously synchronous. A client may hold data from multiple caches rigorously synchronous. A client may hold data from multiple caches
but MUST keep the data marked as to source, as later updates MUST but MUST keep the data marked as to source, as later updates MUST
affect the correct data. affect the correct data.
Just as there may be more than one covering ROA from a single cache, Just as there may be more than one covering ROA from a single cache,
there may be multiple covering ROAs from multiple caches. The there may be multiple covering ROAs from multiple caches. The
results are as described in [RFC6811]. results are as described in [RFC6811].
If data from multiple caches are held, implementations MUST NOT If data from multiple caches are held, implementations MUST NOT
distinguish between data sources when performing validation. distinguish between data sources when performing validation of BGP
announcements.
When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it
would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache. would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache.
The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data, The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data,
regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established
a new connection to the previous cache. a new connection to the previous cache.
A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully
in sync with one or more other caches. in sync with one or more other caches.
A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable See Section 6 for details on what to do when the client is not able
to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The to refresh from a particular cache.
default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache.
If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise
decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the
previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other
caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of
connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache. connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache.
9. Deployment Scenarios 11. Deployment Scenarios
For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios. For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios.
Small End Site: The small multihomed end site may wish to outsource Small End Site: The small multihomed end site may wish to outsource
the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would
exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out-of- exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out-of-
band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to the cache(s) band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to the cache(s)
of one or more upstream ISPs. The ISPs would likely deploy caches of one or more upstream ISPs. The ISPs would likely deploy caches
intended for customer use separately from the caches with which intended for customer use separately from the caches with which
their own BGP speakers peer. their own BGP speakers peer.
Large End Site: A larger multihomed end site might run one or more Large End Site: A larger multihomed end site might run one or more
caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each
fetching from a serving cache that is closer to the Global RPKI. fetching from a serving cache which is closer to the Global RPKI.
They might configure fall-back peerings to upstream ISP caches. They might configure fall-back peerings to upstream ISP caches.
ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant
caches in each major point of presence (PoP), and these caches caches in each major point of presence (PoP), and these caches
would fetch from each other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not would fetch from each other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not
to place undue load on the Global RPKI. to place undue load on the Global RPKI.
Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex
topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph, topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph,
e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition. e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition.
Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible
deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the
Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration. Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration.
To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is
recommended that primary caches that load from the distributed Global recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed
RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour. Choose a Global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour.
random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and jitter the Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and
inter-fetch timing. jitter the inter-fetch timing.
10. Error Codes 12. Error Codes
This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors
expect additions to the list this section during development of the expect additions to the list during development of the initial
initial implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes
codes are listed; see Section 12. Errors that are considered fatal are listed; see Section 14. Errors which are considered fatal MUST
SHOULD cause the session to be dropped. cause the session to be dropped.
0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to
be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes. be corrupt in a manner not specified by another error code.
1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced
some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran
out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera).
2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good
working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a
Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time. Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time.
This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates
that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial
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3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's 3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's
request to be invalid. request to be invalid.
4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not 4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not
known by the receiver of the PDU. known by the receiver of the PDU.
5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the 5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the
receiver of the PDU. receiver of the PDU.
6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0
but a record for the {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple does not but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple for an
exist in the receiver's database. IPvX PDU, or {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router Key
PDU) does not exist in the receiver's database.
7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has an 7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has
identical {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple as a PDU that is still Flag=1 but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple
active in the router. for an IPvX PDU, or {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a
Router Key PDU) is already active in the router.
11. Security Considerations 8: Unexpected Protocol Version (fatal): The received PDU has a
Protocol Version field that differs from the protocol version
negotiated in Section 7.
13. Security Considerations
As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of
security interest are described in the relevant sections. This security interest are described in the relevant sections. This
section points out issues that may not be obvious in other sections. section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections.
Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described
in Section 9 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be given in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be
consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation
process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to
be out of band. be out of band.
Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport session Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport
to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or fully connection to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or
qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address spoofing fully qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address
attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No session would spoofing attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No
be established, as the authorization keys would not match. session would be established, as the authorization keys would not
match.
Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or
transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is
distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means, and can distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means, and can
then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all
the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on
this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can
be lightly protected. be lightly protected.
But, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do the However, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do
validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to the validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to
router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level
security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and
transport have very different threat models than object security. transport have very different threat models than object security.
So, the strength of the trust relationship and the transport So the strength of the trust relationship and the transport
between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're
betting your routing on this. betting your routing on this.
While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due
to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache task to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache task
to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very
critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in
the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM) the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM)
transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be
topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data
are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache. are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache.
The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and
authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any
data are exchanged. data are exchanged.
Transports that cannot provide the necessary authentication and Transports which cannot provide the necessary authentication and
integrity (see Section 7) must rely on network design and integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and
operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/ operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/
corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 7, TCP-AO is the corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the
long-term plan. Protocols that provide integrity and authenticity long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and
SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used as the authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used
transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same trusted, as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same
controlled network. trusted, controlled network.
12. IANA Considerations 14. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned 'well-known' TCP Port Numbers to the RPKI-Router This section only discusses updates required in the existing IANA
Protocol for the following, see Section 7: protocol registries to accommodate version 1 of this protocol. See
[RFC6810] for IANA Considerations from the original (version 0)
protocol.
rpki-rtr All existing entries in the IANA "rpki-rtr-pdu" registry remain valid
rpki-rtr-tls for protocol version 0. All of the PDU types allowed in protocol
version 0 are also allowed in protocol version 1, with the addition
of the new Router Key PDU. To reduce the likelihood of confusion,
the PDU number used by the Router Key PDU in protocol version 1 is
hereby registered as reserved (and unused) in protocol version 0.
IANA has created a registry for tuples of Protocol Version / PDU The policy for adding to the registry is RFC Required per [RFC5226],
Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. The name of the either Standards Track or Experimental.
registry is "rpki-rtr-pdu". The policy for adding to the registry is
RFC Required per [RFC5226], either Standards Track or Experimental.
The initial entries are as follows:
Protocol PDU Assuming that the registry allows range notation in the Protocol
Version Type Description Version field, the updated "rpki-rtr-pdu" registry will be:
-------- ---- ---------------
0 0 Serial Notify
0 1 Serial Query
0 2 Reset Query
0 3 Cache Response
0 4 IPv4 Prefix
0 6 IPv6 Prefix
0 7 End of Data
0 8 Cache Reset
0 10 Error Report
0 255 Reserved
IANA has created a registry for Error Codes 0 to 255. The name of Protocol PDU
the registry is "rpki-rtr-error". The policy for adding to the Version Type Description
registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], where the responsible IESG -------- ---- ---------------
Area Director should appoint the Expert Reviewer. The initial 0-1 0 Serial Notify
entries should be as follows: 0-1 1 Serial Query
0-1 2 Reset Query
0-1 3 Cache Response
0-1 4 IPv4 Prefix
0-1 6 IPv6 Prefix
0-1 7 End of Data
0-1 8 Cache Reset
0 9 Reserved
1 9 Router Key
0-1 10 Error Report
0-1 255 Reserved
Error All existing entries in the IANA "rpki-rtr-error" registry remain
Code Description valid for all protocol versions. Protocol version 1 adds one new
----- ---------------- error code:
0 Corrupt Data
1 Internal Error
2 No Data Available
3 Invalid Request
4 Unsupported Protocol Version
5 Unsupported PDU Type
6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record
7 Duplicate Announcement Received
255 Reserved
IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined Error
in [RFC4250], of 'rpki-rtr'. Code Description
----- ----------------
8 Unexpected Protocol Version
13. Acknowledgments 15. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman, The authors wish to thank Nils Bars, Steve Bellovin, Tim Bruijnzeels,
Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, Sandy Murphy, Robert Rex Fernando, Richard Hansen, Paul Hoffman, Fabian Holler, Russ
Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk, and David Ward. Particular Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, David Mandelberg, Sandy
thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary Murphy, Robert Raszuk, Andreas Reuter, Thomas C. Schmidt, John
fields. Scudder, Ruediger Volk, Matthias Waehlisch, and David Ward.
Particular thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of
unnecessary fields.
14. References No doubt this list is incomplete. We apologize to any contributor
whose name we missed.
14.1. Normative References 16. References
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", 16.1. Normative References
RFC 1982, August 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Turner, S., "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-16 (work in
progress), November 2016.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
MD5 Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. August 1996.
[RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002.
[RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006. Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. 10646", RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
May 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26,
May 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
June 2010.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 June 2010.
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
January 2013. within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
14.2. Informative References [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February
2012.
[RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996. Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
January 2013.
[RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
RFC 4808, March 2007. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
2013.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI 16.2. Informative References
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile [RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5",
for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, RFC 4808, March 2007.
February 2012.
[RTR-IMPL] Bush, R., Austein, R., Patel, K., Gredler, H., and M. [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Waehlisch, "RPKI Router Implementation Report", Work Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
in Progress, January 2012.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
EMail: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
Rob Austein Rob Austein
Dragon Research Labs Dragon Research Labs
EMail: sra@hactrn.net Email: sra@hactrn.net
 End of changes. 150 change blocks. 
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