draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-03.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-04.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein Updates: 6810 (if approved) R. Austein
Expires: September 6, 2015 Dragon Research Labs Intended status: Standards Track Dragon Research Labs
March 5, 2015 Expires: December 17, 2015 June 15, 2015
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-03 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-04
Abstract Abstract
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems and In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems and
Autonomous System Paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple Autonomous System Paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple
but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RFC 6480) prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache. (RFC 6480) prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache.
This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin
data and router keys to routers. data and router keys to routers.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 17, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
11. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 11. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 12. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes) In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes)
and AS paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable and AS paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable
mechanism to receive cryptographically validated Resource Public Key mechanism to receive cryptographically validated Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] prefix origin data and router keys Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] prefix origin data and router keys
from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver
validated prefix origin data and router keys to routers. The design validated prefix origin data and router keys to routers. The design
is intentionally constrained to be usable on much of the current is intentionally constrained to be usable on much of the current
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sequences are described in Section 8. The transport protocol options sequences are described in Section 8. The transport protocol options
are described in Section 9. Section 10 details how routers and are described in Section 9. Section 10 details how routers and
caches are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 11 caches are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 11
describes likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and describes likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and
IANA considerations end the document. IANA considerations end the document.
The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new
semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs
are versioned should deployment experience call for change. are versioned should deployment experience call for change.
For an implementation (not interoperability) report on use of this For an implementation (not interoperability) report on the use of
protocol with prefix origin data, see [RFC7128]. this protocol with prefix origin data, see [RFC7128].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]
only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in
lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning. lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning.
2. Glossary 2. Glossary
The following terms are used with special meaning. The following terms are used with special meaning.
Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a
distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registries (NIRs), and ISPs; Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registries (NIRs), and ISPs;
see [RFC6481]. see [RFC6481].
Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI, which is periodically fetched/ Cache: A coalesced copy of the published Global RPKI data,
refreshed directly or indirectly from the Global RPKI using the periodically fetched or refreshed, directly or indirectly, using
[RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to the [RFC5781] protocol or some successor protocol. Relying party
gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. software is used to gather and validate the distributed data of
the RPKI into a cache. Trusting this cache further is a matter
Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of between the provider of the cache and a relying party.
the cache and a relying party.
Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which
wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a
cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates
its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. While a
cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are cache is receiving updates, new incoming data and implicit deletes
associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the are associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the
fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between
caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache different caches or different protocol versions, nor need it be
server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too maintained across resets of the cache server. See [RFC1982] on
much detail on the topic. DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too much detail on the topic.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session
identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to
bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will
generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session
knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with
that of the cache. that of the cache.
Payload PDU: A protocol message which contains data for use by the
router, as opposed to a PDU which just conveys the semantics of
this protocol. Prefixes and Router Keys are examples of payload
PDUs.
3. Deployment Structure 3. Deployment Structure
Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure
as follows: as follows:
Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a
distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g., distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g.,
the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see [RFC6481]. by the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs (see [RFC6481]).
Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified
caches. A relying party, e.g., router or other client, MUST have caches. A relying party, e.g., router or other client, MUST have
a trust relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any a trust relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any
authoritative cache(s) it uses. cache(s) it uses.
Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol
described in this document. It is said to be a client of the described in this document. It is said to be a client of the
cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of
the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the
cache. cache.
4. Operational Overview 4. Operational Overview
A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more
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configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a
connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which
accept the connections. accept the connections.
The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or
set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches
and the Global RPKI. and the Global RPKI.
Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the
highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the
router's current Serial Number. When a router establishes a new router's current Serial Number, in the form of a Serial Query. When
connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it a router establishes a new connection to a cache, or wishes to reset
sends a Reset Query. a current relationship, it sends a Reset Query.
The Cache responds with all data records which have Serial Numbers The cache responds to the Serial Query with all data records which
greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set, have Serial Numbers greater than that in the router's query. This
in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater' may be the null set, in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent.
must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982]. Note that "greater" MUST take wrap-around into account, see
[RFC1982].
When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets
its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of
Data PDU. Data PDU.
When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to
every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a
good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint. good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint.
The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in
any case. any case.
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As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin
Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers' Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers'
clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour.
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs)
The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of
exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in
Section 8. Section 8.
Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY Reserved fields (marked "zero" in PDU diagrams) MUST be zero on
be ignored on receipt. transmission, and SHOULD be ignored on receipt.
5.1. Fields of a PDU 5.1. Fields of a PDU
PDUs contain the following data elements: PDUs contain the following data elements:
Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 1, Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 1,
denoting the version of this protocol. denoting the version of this protocol.
PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the
PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc. PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc.
Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of
PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from
the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when
completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or
the Global RPKI. the Global RPKI.
Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session Session ID: A 16-bit unsigned integer. When a cache server is
ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the started, it generates a Session ID to identify the instance of the
sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate. cache and to bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache
This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that instance will generate. This allows the router to restart a
the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the failed session knowing that the Serial Number it is using is
cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the commensurate with that of the cache. If, at any time, either the
value of the session identifier is not the same as the other's, router or the cache finds the value of the session identifier is
they MUST completely drop the session and the router MUST flush not the same as the other's, they MUST completely drop the session
all data learned from that cache. and the router MUST flush all data learned from that cache.
Note that sessions are specific to a particular protocol version.
That is: if a cache server supports multiple versions of this
protocol, happens to use the same Session ID value for multiple
protocol versions, and further happens to use the same Serial
Number values for two or more sessions using the same Session ID
but different Protocol Version values, the serial numbers are not
commensurate. The full test for whether serial numbers are
commensurate requires comparing Protocol Version, Session ID, and
Serial Number. To reduce the risk of confusion, cache servers
SHOULD NOT use the same Session ID across multiple protocol
versions, but even if they do, routers MUST treat sessions with
different Protocol Version fields as separate sessions even if
they do happen to have the same Session ID.
Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router
does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and does not realize that the session has changed (old Session ID and
new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become new Session ID have same numeric value), the router may become
confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the
router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the
Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old
and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to
the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the
problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may
respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring
the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain
that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state
that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache
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announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or
IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right
to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right; to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right;
a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU
with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System
Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates
whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one
previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS Number, previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS Number,
subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo. subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo.
The remaining bits in the flags field are reserved for future use.
In protocol version 1, they MUST be 0 on transmission and SHOULD
be ignored on receipt.
Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest
prefix allowed for the prefix. prefix allowed for the prefix.
Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix
allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix
Length element. Length element.
Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA.
Autonomous System Number: A 32-bit unsigned integer representing an Autonomous System Number: A 32-bit unsigned integer representing an
ASN allowed to announce a prefix or associated with a router key. ASN allowed to announce a prefix or associated with a router key.
Subject Key Identifier: 20-octet Subject Key Identifier (SKI) value Subject Key Identifier: 20-octet Subject Key Identifier (SKI) value
of a router key, as described in [RFC6487]. of a router key, as described in [RFC6487].
Subject Public Key Info: a router key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, Subject Public Key Info: a router key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value,
as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full
ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the
ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of Zero: Fields shown as zero MUST be zero on transmission. The value
such a field MUST be ignored on receipt. of such a field SHOULD be ignored on receipt.
5.2. Serial Notify 5.2. Serial Notify
The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data.
The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are
commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed. commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed.
Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an
immediate Serial Query or Reset Query without waiting for the Refresh immediate Serial Query or Reset Query without waiting for the Refresh
Interval timer to expire. Interval timer (see Section 6) to expire.
Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not
in response to a message from the router. in response to a message from the router.
If the router receives a Serial Notify PDU during the initial start-
up period where the router and cache are still negotiating to agree
on a protocol version, the router SHOULD simply ignore the Serial
Notify PDU, even if the Serial Notify PDU is for an unexpected
protocol version. See Section 7 for details.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 1 | 0 | | | 1 | 0 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.3. Serial Query 5.3. Serial Query
Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all
payload PDUs which have Serial Numbers higher than the Serial Number all announcements and withdrawals which have occurred since the
in the Serial Query. Serial Number specified in the Serial Query.
The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU
(Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the (Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the
changes since the Serial Number specified by the router. If there changes since the Serial Number specified by the router, followed by
have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache sends zero or more payload PDUs and an End Of Data PDU.
an End Of Data PDU.
If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router, If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router,
perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in
the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU
(Section 5.9). (Section 5.9).
The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to
ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache
session has not been changed. session has not been changed.
skipping to change at page 9, line 33 skipping to change at page 10, line 29
5.4. Reset Query 5.4. Reset Query
Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the
total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds
with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5). with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5).
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 1 | 2 | | | 1 | 2 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.5. Cache Response 5.5. Cache Response
Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. When replying to
When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache sends the set of
sends the set of all data records it has with Serial Numbers greater announcements and withdrawals that have occurred since the Serial
than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query, Number sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query,
the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case, the the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case, the
withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1 withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1
(announce). (announce).
In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells
the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation. the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation.
In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same
reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e.,
the cache session has not changed. the cache session has not changed.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 1 | 3 | | | 1 | 3 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
skipping to change at page 10, line 25 skipping to change at page 11, line 21
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.6. IPv4 Prefix 5.6. IPv4 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 1 | 4 | | | 1 | 4 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=20 | | Length=20 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | Prefix | Max | | | | Prefix | Max | |
| Flags | Length | Length | zero | | Flags | Length | Length | zero |
| | 0..32 | 0..32 | | | | 0..32 | 0..32 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
skipping to change at page 11, line 25 skipping to change at page 12, line 19
ASN} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an ASN} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an
IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it
already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received
error. error.
5.7. IPv6 Prefix 5.7. IPv6 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 1 | 6 | | | 1 | 6 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=32 | | Length=32 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | Prefix | Max | | | | Prefix | Max | |
| Flags | Length | Length | zero | | Flags | Length | Length | zero |
| | 0..128 | 0..128 | | | | 0..128 | 0..128 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
skipping to change at page 12, line 10 skipping to change at page 13, line 5
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic. Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic.
5.8. End of Data 5.8. End of Data
End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the
request. request.
The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache The Session ID and Protocol Version MUST be the same as that of the
Response which began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs. corresponding Cache Response which began the, possibly null, sequence
of data PDUs.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 1 | 7 | | | 1 | 7 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=24 | | Length=24 |
| | | |
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5.9. Cache Reset 5.9. Cache Reset
The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the
cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial
Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to
issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache. issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | zero |
| 1 | 8 | | | 1 | 8 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.10. Router Key 5.10. Router Key
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | | Protocol | PDU | | |
| Version | Type | Flags | zero | | Version | Type | Flags | zero |
| 1 | 9 | | | | 1 | 9 | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length | | Length |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
+--- ---+
| Subject Key Identifier | | Subject Key Identifier |
| 20 octets | +--- ---+
| |
+--- ---+
| (20 octets) |
+--- ---+
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| AS Number | | AS Number |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Subject Public Key Info | | Subject Public Key Info |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and
0 for a withdrawal.
The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to
have one and only one Router Key PDU for a unique {SKI, ASN, Subject have one and only one Router Key PDU for a unique {SKI, ASN, Subject
Public Key} at any one point in time. Should the router client Public Key} at any one point in time. Should the router client
receive a Router Key PDU with a {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} receive a Router Key PDU with a {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key}
identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate
Announcement Received error. Announcement Received error.
Note that a particular ASN may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs Note that a particular ASN may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs
with different Subject Public Key values, while a particular Subject with different Subject Public Key values, while a particular Subject
Public Key value may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs with Public Key value may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs with
skipping to change at page 16, line 15 skipping to change at page 17, line 15
containing End Of Data PDU. containing End Of Data PDU.
Minimum allowed value: 1 second. Minimum allowed value: 1 second.
Maximum allowed value: 86400 seconds (one day). Maximum allowed value: 86400 seconds (one day).
Recommended default: 3600 seconds (one hour). Recommended default: 3600 seconds (one hour).
Retry Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait Retry Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait
before retrying a failed Serial Query or Reset Query. The router before retrying a failed Serial Query or Reset Query. The router
SHOULD NOT retry sooner than indicated by this parameter. SHOULD NOT retry sooner than indicated by this parameter. Note
that a protocol version mismatch overrides this interval: if the
router needs to downgrade to a lower protocol version number, it
MAY send the first Serial Query or Reset Query immediately.
Countdown for this timer starts upon failure of the query, and Countdown for this timer starts upon failure of the query, and
restarts after each subsequent failure until a query succeeds. restarts after each subsequent failure until a query succeeds.
Minimum allowed value: 1 second. Minimum allowed value: 1 second.
Maximum allowed value: 7200 seconds (two hours). Maximum allowed value: 7200 seconds (two hours).
Recommended default: 600 seconds (ten minutes). Recommended default: 600 seconds (ten minutes).
Expire Interval: This parameter tells the router how long it can Expire Interval: This parameter tells the router how long it can
skipping to change at page 17, line 19 skipping to change at page 18, line 23
Error Report PDU. In this case the router MAY retry the Error Report PDU. In this case the router MAY retry the
connection using protocol version 0. connection using protocol version 0.
2. The cache may reply with a version 0 response. In this case the 2. The cache may reply with a version 0 response. In this case the
router MUST either downgrade to version 0 or terminate the router MUST either downgrade to version 0 or terminate the
connection. connection.
In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of
version 1 will not be available. version 1 will not be available.
If either party receives a PDU containing an unrecognized Protocol
Version (neither 0 nor 1) during this negotiation, it MUST either
downgrade to a known version or terminate the connection, with an
Error Report PDU unless the received PDU is itself an Error Report
PDU.
The router MUST ignore any Serial Notify PDUs it might receive from
the cache during this initial start-up period, regardless of the
Protocol Version field in the Serial Notify PDU. Since Session ID
and Serial Number values are specific to a particular protocol
version, the values in the notification are not useful to the router.
Even if these values were meaningful, the only effect that processing
the notification would have would be to trigger exactly the same
Reset Query or Serial Query that the router has already sent as part
of the not-yet-complete version negotiation process, so there is
nothing to be gained by processing notifications until version
negotiation completes.
Caches SHOULD NOT send Serial Notify PDUs before version negotiation
completes. Note, however, that routers must handle such
notifications (by ignoring them) for backwards compatibility with
caches serving protocol version 0.
Once the cache and router have agreed upon a Protocol Version via the
negotiation process above, that version is stable for the life of the
session. See Section 5.1 for a discussion of the interaction between
Protocol Version and Session ID.
If either party receives a PDU for a different Protocol Version once
the above negotiation completes, that party MUST drop the session;
unless the PDU containing the unexpected Protocol Version was itself
an Error Report PDU, the party dropping the session SHOULD send an
Error Report with an error code of 8 ("Unexpected Protocol Version").
8. Protocol Sequences 8. Protocol Sequences
The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as
follows: follows:
8.1. Start or Restart 8.1. Start or Restart
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query) | <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query)
skipping to change at page 21, line 5 skipping to change at page 22, line 39
If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on
the same trusted and controlled network. the same trusted and controlled network.
If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the
following more protected protocols. following more protected protocols.
Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the
rpki-rtr port. rpki-rtr port.
Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using the normal
normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 9.1. SSH port. For an example, see Section 9.1.
Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the
rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO
[RFC5925]. [RFC5925].
Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki- Caches and routers MAY use TCP over IPsec transport [RFC4301] using
rtr port. the rpki-rtr port.
Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port, Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port,
rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 14. rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 14.
9.1. SSH Transport 9.1. SSH Transport
To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport
connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and
server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The
client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the
skipping to change at page 24, line 18 skipping to change at page 26, line 5
When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it
would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache. would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache.
The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data, The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data,
regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established
a new connection to the previous cache. a new connection to the previous cache.
A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully
in sync with one or more other caches. in sync with one or more other caches.
A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable See Section 6 for details on what to do when the client is not able
to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The to refresh from a particular cache.
default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache.
If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise
decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the
previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other
caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of
connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache. connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache.
11. Deployment Scenarios 11. Deployment Scenarios
For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios. For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios.
skipping to change at page 25, line 24 skipping to change at page 27, line 14
12. Error Codes 12. Error Codes
This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors
expect additions to the list during development of the initial expect additions to the list during development of the initial
implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes
are listed; see Section 14. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD are listed; see Section 14. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD
cause the session to be dropped. cause the session to be dropped.
0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to
be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes. be corrupt in a manner not specified by another error code.
1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced
some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran
out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera).
2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good
working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a
Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time. Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time.
This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates
that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial
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6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0
but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple for an but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple for an
IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router Key IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router Key
PDU) does not exist in the receiver's database. PDU) does not exist in the receiver's database.
7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has 7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has
Flag=1 but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple Flag=1 but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple
for an IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router for an IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router
Key PDU) is already active in the router. Key PDU) is already active in the router.
8: Unexpected Protocol Version (fatal): The received PDU has a
Protocol Version field that differs from the protocol version
negotiated in Section 7.
13. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of
security interest are described in the relevant sections. This security interest are described in the relevant sections. This
section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections. section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections.
Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described
in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be
given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation
process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to
skipping to change at page 26, line 36 skipping to change at page 28, line 31
be established, as the authorization keys would not match. be established, as the authorization keys would not match.
Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or
transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is
distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means, and can distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means, and can
then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all
the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on
this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can
be lightly protected. be lightly protected.
But, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do the However, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do
validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to the validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to
router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level
security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and
transport have very different threat models than object security. transport have very different threat models than object security.
So, the strength of the trust relationship and the transport So the strength of the trust relationship and the transport
between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're
betting your routing on this. betting your routing on this.
While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due
to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache task to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache task
to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very
critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in
the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM) the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM)
transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be
topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data
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integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and
operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/ operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/
corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the
long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and
authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used
as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same
trusted, controlled network. trusted, controlled network.
14. IANA Considerations 14. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned "well-known" TCP Port Numbers to the RPKI-Router This section only discusses updates required in the existing IANA
Protocol for the following, see Section 9: protocol registries to accommodate version 1 of this protocol. See
[RFC6810] for IANA Considerations from the original (version 0)
protocol.
rpki-rtr All existing entries in the IANA "rpki-rtr-pdu" registry remain valid
rpki-rtr-tls for protocol version 0. All of the PDU types allowed in protocol
version 0 are also allowed in protocol version 1, with the addition
of the new Router Key PDU. To reduce the likelihood of confusion,
the PDU number used by the Router Key PDU in protocol version 1 is
hereby registered as reserved (and unused) in protocol version 0.
IANA has created a registry for tuples of Protocol Version / PDU The policy for adding to the registry is RFC Required per [RFC5226],
Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. The name of the either Standards Track or Experimental.
registry is "rpki-rtr-pdu". The policy for adding to the registry is
RFC Required per [RFC5226], either Standards Track or Experimental. Assuming that the registry allows range notation in the Protocol
The initial entries are as follows: Version field, the updated "rpki-rtr-pdu" registry will be:
Protocol PDU Protocol PDU
Version Type Description Version Type Description
-------- ---- --------------- -------- ---- ---------------
0 0 Serial Notify 0-1 0 Serial Notify
0 1 Serial Query 0-1 1 Serial Query
0 2 Reset Query 0-1 2 Reset Query
0 3 Cache Response 0-1 3 Cache Response
0 4 IPv4 Prefix 0-1 4 IPv4 Prefix
0 6 IPv6 Prefix 0-1 6 IPv6 Prefix
0 7 End of Data 0-1 7 End of Data
0 8 Cache Reset 0-1 8 Cache Reset
0 10 Error Report 0 9 Reserved
0 255 Reserved 1 9 Router Key
0-1 10 Error Report
0-1 255 Reserved
IANA has created a registry for Error Codes 0 to 255. The name of All exiting entries in the IANA "rpki-rtr-error" registry remain
the registry is "rpki-rtr-error". The policy for adding to the valid for all protocol versions. Protocol version 1 adds one new
registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], where the responsible IESG error code:
Area Director should appoint the Expert Reviewer. The initial
entries are as follows:
Error Error
Code Description Code Description
----- ---------------- ----- ----------------
0 Corrupt Data 8 Unexpected Protocol Version
1 Internal Error
2 No Data Available
3 Invalid Request
4 Unsupported Protocol Version
5 Unsupported PDU Type
6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record
7 Duplicate Announcement Received
255 Reserved
IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined
in [RFC4250], of "rpki-rtr".
15. Acknowledgments 15. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Nils Bars, Steve Bellovin, Tim Bruijnzeels, The authors wish to thank Nils Bars, Steve Bellovin, Tim Bruijnzeels,
Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman, Fabian Holler, Russ Housley, Pradosh Rex Fernando, Richard Hansen, Paul Hoffman, Fabian Holler, Russ
Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, David Mandelberg, Sandy Murphy, Robert Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, David Mandelberg, Sandy
Raszuk, Andreas Reuter, Thomas C. Schmidt, John Scudder, Ruediger Murphy, Robert Raszuk, Andreas Reuter, Thomas C. Schmidt, John
Volk, Matthias Waehlisch, and David Ward. Particular thanks go to Scudder, Ruediger Volk, Matthias Waehlisch, and David Ward.
Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary fields. Particular thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of
unnecessary fields.
No doubt this list is incomplete. We apologize to any contributor
whose name we missed.
16. References 16. References
16.1. Normative References 16.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-09 (work in Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-09 (work in
progress), January 2015. progress), January 2015.
skipping to change at page 29, line 9 skipping to change at page 30, line 45
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
[RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for [RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for
Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and
Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002. Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002.
[RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26,
May 2008. May 2008.
skipping to change at page 30, line 35 skipping to change at page 32, line 21
Router Implementation Report", RFC 7128, February 2014. Router Implementation Report", RFC 7128, February 2014.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
Rob Austein Rob Austein
Dragon Research Labs Dragon Research Labs
Email: sra@hactrn.net Email: sra@hactrn.net
 End of changes. 52 change blocks. 
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