rfc6810.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-00.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Request for Comments: 6810 Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Category: Standards Track R. Austein Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein
ISSN: 2070-1721 Dragon Research Labs Expires: September 12, 2014 Dragon Research Labs
January 2013 March 11, 2014
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-00
Abstract Abstract
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP
announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to
receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin
data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to
deliver validated prefix origin data to routers. deliver validated prefix origin data to routers.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document. This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
received public review and has been approved for publication by the working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810. time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.10. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 11. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 12. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes) In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes)
of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to
receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]
cryptographically validated prefix origin data from a trusted cache. cryptographically validated prefix origin data from a trusted cache.
This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin
data to routers. The design is intentionally constrained to be data to routers. The design is intentionally constrained to be
usable on much of the current generation of ISP router platforms. usable on much of the current generation of ISP router platforms.
Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then
presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the
protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU
sequences are described in Section 6. The transport protocol options sequences are described in Section 8. The transport protocol options
are described in Section 7. Section 8 details how routers and caches are described in Section 9. Section 10 details how routers and
are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 9 describes caches are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 11
likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and IANA describes likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and
considerations end the document. IANA considerations end the document.
The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new
semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs
are versioned should deployment experience call for change. are versioned should deployment experience call for change.
For an implementation (not interoperability) report, see [RTR-IMPL] For an implementation (not interoperability) report, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl]
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]
only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in
lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning. lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning.
2. Glossary 2. Glossary
The following terms are used with special meaning. The following terms are used with special meaning.
Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a
distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registry (NIRs), and ISPs; Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registries (NIRs), and ISPs;
see [RFC6481]. see [RFC6481].
Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI, which is periodically fetched/ Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI, which is periodically fetched/
refreshed directly or indirectly from the Global RPKI using the refreshed directly or indirectly from the Global RPKI using the
[RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to [RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to
gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache.
Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of
the cache and a relying party. the cache and a relying party.
Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer that Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which
wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a
cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates
its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a
cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are
associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the
fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between
caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache
server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too
much detail on the topic. much detail on the topic.
skipping to change at page 5, line 15 skipping to change at page 5, line 15
The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or
set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches
and the Global RPKI. and the Global RPKI.
Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the
highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the
router's current Serial Number. When a router establishes a new router's current Serial Number. When a router establishes a new
connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it
sends a Reset Query. sends a Reset Query.
The Cache responds with all data records that have Serial Numbers The Cache responds with all data records which have Serial Numbers
greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set, greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set,
in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater' in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater'
must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982]. must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982].
When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets
its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of
Data PDU. Data PDU.
When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to
every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a
good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint. good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint.
The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in
any case. any case.
Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for
a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very
inefficient. The Serial Number based incremental update mechanism inefficient. The Serial Number based incremental update mechanism
allows an efficient transfer of just the data records that have allows an efficient transfer of just the data records which have
changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on
incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a
full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the
necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer
protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit
request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the
cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established
sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better
service. service.
As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin
Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers' Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers'
clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour.
5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs)
The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of
exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in
Section 6. Section 8.
Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY
be ignored on receipt. be ignored on receipt.
5.1. Fields of a PDU 5.1. Fields of a PDU
PDUs contain the following data elements: PDUs contain the following data elements:
Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 0, Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 1,
denoting the version of this protocol. denoting the version of this protocol.
PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the
PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc. PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc.
Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of
PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from
the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when
completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or
the Global RPKI. the Global RPKI.
skipping to change at page 7, line 4 skipping to change at page 6, line 47
confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the
router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the
Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old
and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to
the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the
problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may
respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring
the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain
that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state
that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache
Response may tell the router to drop a record that the router does Response may tell the router to drop a record which the router
not hold, or may tell the router to add a record that the router does not hold, or may tell the router to add a record which the
already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error and router already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error
reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay out and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay
of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any data out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any
currently held by the router. data currently held by the router.
Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock- Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock-
based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the
risk of session identifier collisions. risk of session identifier collisions.
The Session ID might be a pseudo-random value, a strictly The Session ID might be a pseudo-random value, a strictly
increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, etc. increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, etc.
Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer that has as its value the count of Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count
the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of header of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of
that end with the length field. header which end with the length field.
Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an
announcement and 0 for a withdrawal, whether this PDU announces a announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or
new right to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right
announced right. A withdraw effectively deletes one previously to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right;
announced IPvX (IPv4 or IPv6) Prefix PDU with the exact same a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU
Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System Number (ASN). with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System
Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates
whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one
previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS
Numbers, subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo.
Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest
prefix allowed for the prefix. prefix allowed for the prefix.
Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix
allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix
Length element. Length element.
Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA.
skipping to change at page 8, line 12 skipping to change at page 7, line 49
Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of
such a field MUST be ignored on receipt. such a field MUST be ignored on receipt.
5.2. Serial Notify 5.2. Serial Notify
The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data.
The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are
commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed. commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed.
Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an
immediate Serial Query or Reset Query without waiting for the Refresh
Interval timer to expire.
Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not
in response to a message from the router. in response to a message from the router.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 0 | | | 1 | 0 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.3. Serial Query 5.3. Serial Query
Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all
payload PDUs that have Serial Numbers higher than the Serial Number payload PDUs which have Serial Numbers higher than the Serial Number
in the Serial Query. in the Serial Query.
The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU
(Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the (Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the
changes since the Serial Number specified by the router. If there changes since the Serial Number specified by the router. If there
have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache sends have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache sends
an End Of Data PDU. an End Of Data PDU.
If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router, If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router,
perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in
skipping to change at page 9, line 9 skipping to change at page 9, line 9
(Section 5.9). (Section 5.9).
The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to
ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache
session has not been changed. session has not been changed.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=12 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.4. Reset Query 5.4. Reset Query
Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the
total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds
with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5). with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5).
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 2 | | | 1 | 2 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.5. Cache Response 5.5. Cache Response
Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs.
When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache
skipping to change at page 10, line 9 skipping to change at page 10, line 9
In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells
the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation. the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation.
In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same
reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e.,
the cache session has not changed. the cache session has not changed.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 3 | | | 1 | 3 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.6. IPv4 Prefix 5.6. IPv4 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 4 | | | 1 | 4 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=20 | | Length=20 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | Prefix | Max | | | | Prefix | Max | |
| Flags | Length | Length | zero | | Flags | Length | Length | zero |
| | 0..32 | 0..32 | | | | 0..32 | 0..32 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
skipping to change at page 11, line 21 skipping to change at page 11, line 20
IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it
already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received
error. error.
5.7. IPv6 Prefix 5.7. IPv6 Prefix
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 6 | | | 1 | 6 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=32 | | Length=32 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | Prefix | Max | | | | Prefix | Max | |
| Flags | Length | Length | zero | | Flags | Length | Length | zero |
| | 0..128 | 0..128 | | | | 0..128 | 0..128 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
skipping to change at page 12, line 11 skipping to change at page 11, line 51
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic. Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic.
5.8. End of Data 5.8. End of Data
End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the
request. request.
The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache
Response that began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs. Response which began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Session ID | | Version | Type | Session ID |
| 0 | 7 | | | 1 | 7 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=12 | | Length=24 |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Serial Number | | Serial Number |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Refresh Interval |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Retry Interval |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Expire Interval |
| |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
The Refresh Interval, Retry Interval, and Expire Interval are all
32-bit elapsed times measured in seconds, and express the timing
parameters that the cache expects the router to use to decide when
next to send the cache another Serial Query or Reset Query PDU. See
Section 6 for an explanation of the use and the range of allowed
values for these parameters.
5.9. Cache Reset 5.9. Cache Reset
The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the
cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial
Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to
issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache. issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache.
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | reserved = zero | | Version | Type | reserved = zero |
| 0 | 8 | | | 1 | 8 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length=8 | | Length=8 |
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
5.10. Error Report 5.10. Router Key
0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | |
| Version | Type | Flags | AS Count |
| 1 | 9 | | |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Length |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Subject Key Identifier |
| 20 octets |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| AS Numbers |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| Subject Public Key Info |
| |
`-------------------------------------------'
In addition to the normal boilerplate fields of an RPKI-Router PDU,
the Router Key PDU has the following fields.
Subject Key Identifier is the 20-octet subjectKeyIdentifier (SKI)
value for the Router Key, as described in [RFC6487].
AS Numbers contains one or more Autonomous System Numbers. The
number of ASNs is specified in the AS Count field. To simplify
comparision, the ASNs within this field MUST be sorted into
increasing numerical order considered as unsigned big-endian
32-bit integers.
Subject Public Key Info is the Router Key's subjectPublicKeyInfo as
described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1
DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag
and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
5.11. Error Report
This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other.
Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs. Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs.
The Error Code is described in Section 10. The Error Code is described in Section 12.
If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated
with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST
be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero. be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero.
An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an
erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be
dropped. dropped.
If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too
skipping to change at page 13, line 25 skipping to change at page 15, line 9
possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated. possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated.
The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error
Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a
string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]). string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]).
0 8 16 24 31 0 8 16 24 31
.-------------------------------------------. .-------------------------------------------.
| Protocol | PDU | | | Protocol | PDU | |
| Version | Type | Error Code | | Version | Type | Error Code |
| 0 | 10 | | | 1 | 10 | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length | | Length |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Length of Encapsulated PDU | | Length of Encapsulated PDU |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
skipping to change at page 14, line 5 skipping to change at page 15, line 34
| Length of Error Text | | Length of Error Text |
| | | |
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| Arbitrary Text | | Arbitrary Text |
| of | | of |
~ Error Diagnostic Message ~ ~ Error Diagnostic Message ~
| | | |
`-------------------------------------------' `-------------------------------------------'
6. Protocol Sequences 6. Protocol Timing Parameters
Since the data the cache distributes via the rpki-rtr protocol are
retrieved from the Global RPKI system at intervals which are only
known to the cache, only the cache can really know how frequently it
makes sense for the router to poll the cache, or how long the data
are likely to remain valid (or, at least, unchanged). For this
reason, as well as to allow the cache some control over the load
placed on it by its client routers, the End Of Data PDU includes
three values that allow the router to communicate timing parameters
to the router.
Refresh Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait
before next attempting to poll the cache, using a Serial Query or
Reset Query PDU. Note that receipt of a Serial Notify PDU
overrides this interval and allows the router to issue an
immediate query without waiting for the Refresh Interval to
expire. Countdown for this timer starts upon receipt of the
containing End Of Data PDU.
Minimum allowed value: 120 seconds (two minutes).
Maximum allowed value: 86400 seconds (one day).
Recommended default: 3600 seconds (one hour).
Retry Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait
before retrying a failed Serial Query or Reset Query. Countdown
for this timer starts upon failure of the query, and restarts
after each subsequent failure until a query succeeds.
Minimum allowed value: 120 seconds (two minutes).
Maximum allowed value: 7200 seconds (two hours).
Recommended default: 600 seconds (ten minutes).
Expire Interval: This parameter tells the router how long it can
continue to use the current version of the data while unable to
perform a sucessful query. Countdown for this timer starts upon
receipt of the containing End Of Data PDU.
Minimum allowed value: 600 seconds (ten minutes).
Maximum allowed value: 172800 seconds (two days).
Recommended default: 7200 seconds (two hours).
If the router has never issued a succesful query against a particular
cache, it retry periodically using the default Retry Interval, above.
7. Protocol Version Negotiation
A router MUST start each transport session by issuing either a Reset
Query or a Serial Query. This query will tell the cache which
version of this protocol the router implements.
If a cache which supports version 1 receieves a query from a router
which specifies version 0, the cache MUST downgrade to protocol
version 0 [RFC6810] or terminate the session.
If a router which supports version 1 sends a query to a cache which
only supports version 0, one of two things will happen.
1. The cache may terminate the connection, perhaps with a version 0
Error Report PDU. In this case the router MAY retry the
connection using protocol version 0.
2. The cache may reply with a version 0 response. In this case the
router MUST either downgrade to version 0 or terminate the
connection.
In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of
version 1 will not be available.
8. Protocol Sequences
The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as
follows: follows:
6.1. Start or Restart 8.1. Start or Restart
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query) | <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query)
| | | |
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs
| ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data
skipping to change at page 14, line 37 skipping to change at page 17, line 44
Alternatively, if the router has significant unexpired data from a Alternatively, if the router has significant unexpired data from a
broken session with the same cache, it MAY start with a Serial Query broken session with the same cache, it MAY start with a Serial Query
containing the Session ID from the previous session to ensure the containing the Session ID from the previous session to ensure the
Serial Numbers are commensurate. Serial Numbers are commensurate.
This Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a This Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a
Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost
its way. its way.
The router MUST send either a Reset Query or a Serial Query when
starting a transport session, in order to confirm that router and
cache are speaking compatible versions of the protocol. See
Section 7 for details on version negotiation.
To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to
generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial
Query or a Reset Query no less frequently than once an hour. This Query or a Reset Query periodically. This also acts as a keep-alive
also acts as a keep-alive at the application layer. at the application layer. See Section 6 for details on the required
polling frequency.
As the cache MAY not keep updates for little more than one hour, the
router MUST have a polling interval of no greater than once an hour.
6.2. Typical Exchange 8.2. Typical Exchange
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| -------- Notify ----------> | (optional) | -------- Notify ----------> | (optional)
| | | |
| <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data | <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data
| | | |
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix
skipping to change at page 15, line 33 skipping to change at page 18, line 35
router MAY then issue a Serial Query earlier than it otherwise might. router MAY then issue a Serial Query earlier than it otherwise might.
This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate
limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute. limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute.
When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the
router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new
data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer
than the serial in the Serial Query. than the serial in the Serial Query.
To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router
MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query no less frequently MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query periodially. See
than once an hour. Section 6 for details on the required polling frequency.
6.3. No Incremental Update Available
8.3. No Incremental Update Available
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data
| ------- Cache Reset ------> | C cannot supply update | ------- Cache Reset ------> | C cannot supply update
| | from specified serial | | from specified serial
| <------ Reset Query ------- | R requests new data | <------ Reset Query ------- | R requests new data
| ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix
| ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs
skipping to change at page 16, line 18 skipping to change at page 19, line 31
cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long
between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer
believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space
and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state
arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that
it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router
SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache
list. If there are no more preferred caches, it MUST issue a Reset list. If there are no more preferred caches, it MUST issue a Reset
Query and get an entire new load from the cache. Query and get an entire new load from the cache.
6.4. Cache Has No Data Available 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data
| ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available
~ ~ ~ ~
Cache Router Cache Router
~ ~ ~ ~
| <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data | <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data
skipping to change at page 17, line 5 skipping to change at page 20, line 13
sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it
initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still
rebuilding its database. rebuilding its database.
When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt
to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference
order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue
periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the
cache. cache.
7. Transport 9. Transport
The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the
binary PDUs in a persistent session. binary PDUs in a persistent session.
To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it
is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to
each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to
protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately, protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately,
there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms. there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms.
Therefore, as of the writing of this document, there is no mandatory- Therefore, as of the writing of this document, there is no mandatory-
to-implement transport that provides authentication and integrity to-implement transport which provides authentication and integrity
protection. protection.
To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both
caches and routers SHOULD enable keep-alives when available in the caches and routers SHOULD enable keep-alives when available in the
chosen transport protocol. chosen transport protocol.
It is expected that, when the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) It is expected that, when the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)
[RFC5925] is available on all platforms deployed by operators, it [RFC5925] is available on all platforms deployed by operators, it
will become the mandatory-to-implement transport. will become the mandatory-to-implement transport.
Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP
using a port, rpki-rtr (323); see Section 12. Operators SHOULD use using a port, rpki-rtr (323); see Section 14. Operators SHOULD use
procedural means, e.g., access control lists (ACLs), to reduce the procedural means, e.g., access control lists (ACLs), to reduce the
exposure to authentication issues. exposure to authentication issues.
Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec
transport. transport.
If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on
the same trusted and controlled network. the same trusted and controlled network.
If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the
following more protected protocols. following more protected protocols.
Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the
rpki-rtr port. rpki-rtr port.
Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the
normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 7.1. normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 9.1.
Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the
rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO
[RFC5925]. [RFC5925].
Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki- Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki-
rtr port. rtr port.
Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port, Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port,
rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 12. rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 14.
7.1. SSH Transport 9.1. SSH Transport
To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport
connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and
server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The
client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the
application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol
[RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated, [RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated,
the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the
SSH connection protocol. SSH connection protocol.
skipping to change at page 18, line 41 skipping to change at page 22, line 5
band by some reasonably secured means. band by some reasonably secured means.
Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and Digital Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) authentication and SHOULD accept Elliptic Signature Algorithm (DSA) authentication and SHOULD accept Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) authentication. User Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) authentication. User
authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be
supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication. supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication.
Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache to avoid Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache to avoid
monkey-in-the-middle attacks. monkey-in-the-middle attacks.
7.2. TLS Transport 9.2. TLS Transport
Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side
certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to
allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from
unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and
certificate authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache certificate authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache
operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue
certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential
rollover; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may rollover; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may
be used. be used.
skipping to change at page 19, line 19 skipping to change at page 22, line 31
connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the
connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection. connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection.
Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using
subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid
monkey-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in monkey-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in
[RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations: [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations:
Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity
in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server
and client implementations that use TLS. Certification and client implementations which use TLS. Certification
authorities that issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support authorities which issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support
the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be
present in rpki-rtr server certificates. present in rpki-rtr server certificates.
DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
wildcard character "*". wildcard character "*".
rpki-rtr implementations that use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID
identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's
subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the
rules described in [RFC6125]. rules described in [RFC6125].
The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS
name of the rpki-rtr cache. name of the rpki-rtr cache.
7.3. TCP MD5 Transport 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport
If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at
least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385]. least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385].
Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least
32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits.
Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD
support [RFC4808]. support [RFC4808].
7.4. TCP-AO Transport 9.4. TCP-AO Transport
Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable
ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences
of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. MAC (Message of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. Message Authentication
Authentication Code) lengths of at least 96 bits MUST be supported, Code (MAC) lengths of at least 96 bits MUST be supported, per
per Section 5.1 of [RFC5925]. Section 5.1 of [RFC5925].
The cryptographic algorithms and associated parameters described in The cryptographic algorithms and associcated parameters described in
[RFC5926] MUST be supported. [RFC5926] MUST be supported.
8. Router-Cache Setup 10. Router-Cache Setup
A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is
configured to support. configured to support.
A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a
cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must
have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In
addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value
for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not
trust, preferred belief, etc. The client router attempts to trust, preferred belief, etc. The client router attempts to
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A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable
to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The
default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache. default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache.
If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise
decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the
previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other
caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of
connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache. connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache.
9. Deployment Scenarios 11. Deployment Scenarios
For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios. For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios.
Small End Site: The small multihomed end site may wish to outsource Small End Site: The small multihomed end site may wish to outsource
the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would
exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out-of- exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out-of-
band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to the cache(s) band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to the cache(s)
of one or more upstream ISPs. The ISPs would likely deploy caches of one or more upstream ISPs. The ISPs would likely deploy caches
intended for customer use separately from the caches with which intended for customer use separately from the caches with which
their own BGP speakers peer. their own BGP speakers peer.
Large End Site: A larger multihomed end site might run one or more Large End Site: A larger multihomed end site might run one or more
caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each
fetching from a serving cache that is closer to the Global RPKI. fetching from a serving cache which is closer to the Global RPKI.
They might configure fall-back peerings to upstream ISP caches. They might configure fall-back peerings to upstream ISP caches.
ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant
caches in each major point of presence (PoP), and these caches caches in each major point of presence (PoP), and these caches
would fetch from each other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not would fetch from each other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not
to place undue load on the Global RPKI. to place undue load on the Global RPKI.
Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex
topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph, topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph,
e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition. e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition.
Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible
deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the
Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration. Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration.
To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is
recommended that primary caches that load from the distributed Global recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed
RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour. Choose a Global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour.
random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and jitter the Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and
inter-fetch timing. jitter the inter-fetch timing.
10. Error Codes 12. Error Codes
This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors
expect additions to the list this section during development of the expect additions to the list during development of the initial
initial implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes
codes are listed; see Section 12. Errors that are considered fatal are listed; see Section 14. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD
SHOULD cause the session to be dropped. cause the session to be dropped.
0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to
be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes. be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes.
1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced
some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran
out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera).
2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good
working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a
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known by the receiver of the PDU. known by the receiver of the PDU.
5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the 5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the
receiver of the PDU. receiver of the PDU.
6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0
but a record for the {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple does not but a record for the {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple does not
exist in the receiver's database. exist in the receiver's database.
7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has an 7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has an
identical {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple as a PDU that is still identical {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple as a PDU which is
active in the router. still active in the router.
11. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of
security interest are described in the relevant sections. This security interest are described in the relevant sections. This
section points out issues that may not be obvious in other sections. section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections.
Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described
in Section 9 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be given in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be
consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation
process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to
be out of band. be out of band.
Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport session Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport session
to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or fully to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or fully
qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address spoofing qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address spoofing
attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No session would attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No session would
be established, as the authorization keys would not match. be established, as the authorization keys would not match.
Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or
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critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in
the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM) the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM)
transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be
topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data
are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache. are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache.
The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and
authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any
data are exchanged. data are exchanged.
Transports that cannot provide the necessary authentication and Transports which cannot provide the necessary authentication and
integrity (see Section 7) must rely on network design and integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and
operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/ operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/
corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 7, TCP-AO is the corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the
long-term plan. Protocols that provide integrity and authenticity long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and
SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used as the authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used
transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same trusted, as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same
controlled network. trusted, controlled network.
12. IANA Considerations 14. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned 'well-known' TCP Port Numbers to the RPKI-Router IANA has assigned "well-known" TCP Port Numbers to the RPKI-Router
Protocol for the following, see Section 7: Protocol for the following, see Section 9:
rpki-rtr rpki-rtr
rpki-rtr-tls rpki-rtr-tls
IANA has created a registry for tuples of Protocol Version / PDU IANA has created a registry for tuples of Protocol Version / PDU
Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. The name of the Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. The name of the
registry is "rpki-rtr-pdu". The policy for adding to the registry is registry is "rpki-rtr-pdu". The policy for adding to the registry is
RFC Required per [RFC5226], either Standards Track or Experimental. RFC Required per [RFC5226], either Standards Track or Experimental.
The initial entries are as follows: The initial entries are as follows:
Protocol PDU Protocol PDU
Version Type Description Version Type Description
-------- ---- --------------- -------- ---- ---------------
0 0 Serial Notify 0 0 Serial Notify
0 1 Serial Query 0 1 Serial Query
0 2 Reset Query 0 2 Reset Query
0 3 Cache Response 0 3 Cache Response
0 4 IPv4 Prefix 0 4 IPv4 Prefix
0 6 IPv6 Prefix 0 6 IPv6 Prefix
0 7 End of Data 0 7 End of Data
0 8 Cache Reset 0 8 Cache Reset
0 10 Error Report 0 10 Error Report
0 255 Reserved 0 255 Reserved
IANA has created a registry for Error Codes 0 to 255. The name of IANA has created a registry for Error Codes 0 to 255. The name of
the registry is "rpki-rtr-error". The policy for adding to the the registry is "rpki-rtr-error". The policy for adding to the
registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], where the responsible IESG registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], where the responsible IESG
Area Director should appoint the Expert Reviewer. The initial Area Director should appoint the Expert Reviewer. The initial
entries should be as follows: entries are as follows:
Error Error
Code Description Code Description
----- ---------------- ----- ----------------
0 Corrupt Data 0 Corrupt Data
1 Internal Error 1 Internal Error
2 No Data Available 2 No Data Available
3 Invalid Request 3 Invalid Request
4 Unsupported Protocol Version 4 Unsupported Protocol Version
5 Unsupported PDU Type 5 Unsupported PDU Type
6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record 6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record
7 Duplicate Announcement Received 7 Duplicate Announcement Received
255 Reserved 255 Reserved
IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined
in [RFC4250], of 'rpki-rtr'. in [RFC4250], of "rpki-rtr".
13. Acknowledgments 15. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman, The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman,
Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, Sandy Murphy, Robert Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, Sandy Murphy, Robert
Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk, and David Ward. Particular Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk, and David Ward. Particular
thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary
fields. fields.
14. References 16. References
14.1. Normative References 16.1. Normative References
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
RFC 1982, August 1996. Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-05 (work in
progress), September 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. August 1996.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
MD5 Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002.
[RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for
Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006. Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and
Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
May 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26,
May 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
[RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
June 2010. June 2010.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February
January 2013. 2012.
14.2. Informative References [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
January 2013.
[RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
2013.
[RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", 16.2. Informative References
RFC 4808, March 2007.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl]
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. Bush, R., Austein, R., Patel, K., Gredler, H., and M.
Waehlisch, "RPKI Router Implementation Report", draft-
ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl-05 (work in progress), December
2013.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile [RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", RFC
for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 4808, March 2007.
February 2012.
[RTR-IMPL] Bush, R., Austein, R., Patel, K., Gredler, H., and M. [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Waehlisch, "RPKI Router Implementation Report", Work Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
in Progress, January 2012.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
EMail: randy@psg.com Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com
Rob Austein Rob Austein
Dragon Research Labs Dragon Research Labs
EMail: sra@hactrn.net Email: sra@hactrn.net
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